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Dear colleagues, 
At the end of the present letter we enclose the 
Motion for a Resolution on the European Parlia-
ment's Position concerning the Reform of the 
Treaties and the Achievement of the European 
Union. The Institutional Committee approved the 
motion in its session of 26 May, and will present it 
for debate and vote at the July session of the 
Parliament. Some reflexions on its political 
significance seem to us to be of some usefulness. 
Altiero Spinelli 
Felice Ippolito 
A Broad Consensus in the Institutional Committee 
In carrying out its assignment, the Institutional 
Committee has been fully aware that it is breaking 
new ground - decisive for the future of the Com-
munity - where everything, including its method 
of working, has to be invented. For this reason the 
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Stage 
Committee devoted four months to the prepara-
tion of this initial document before submitting it 
for discussion in plenary session. 
The text was rewritten several times by the rap-
porteur to take account of the general discussion 
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2 in committee. In its last meeting, on 24, 25 and 26 May, the Institutional Committee examined 90 
amendments, and nearly all the contents thereof 
were incorporated in a final redrafting that was 
then approved article by article and finally in its 
entirety. 
The amendments had been offered by a large 
number of MEPs, coming from all the Parliamen-
tary groups, which ensured significant participa-
tion by all the political families in the formulation 
of the text. The full freedom of thought exercised 
by the Committee members, and their attention to 
the arguments of the others, made it possible very 
To What End the July Debate? 
So the Institutional Committee has decided to ask 
Parliament to approve the Guidelines the Commit-
tee intends to follow in its constitutional work. 
Why this interlocutory stage? Wasn't the 9 July 
mandate enough to allow the Committee to pro-
ceed with its labors right up to the presentation of 
its definitive proposals to Parliament? 
Actually, the procedure adopted by the Institu-
tional Committee demonstrates better than any 
argurnentation what difference lies between the 
political philosophy inspiring Parliament and that 
which underlies the attitude of the Council and 
the Commission. 
In fact, the Council, too, is at present working on 
institutional modifications, using the Genscher-
Colombo Plan as a basis (2). Truth to tell, it is 
something of an exageration to say the Council is 
working, as all it has done so far has been to 
assign a committee of diplomats, known as the de 
Schouteete Committee, to work on the topic. We 
do not intend here to go into the merits of what 
(1) For a definition of the term «innovator» and of its opposite, «immobi-
list», see Crocodile, letter 4 page 7. 
(2) For a critique of the Genscher-Colombo Plan, see Crocodile letter 
no. 7. 
often to achieve syntheses among the various 
texts that enjoyed very large majority support. 
In the end, the draft resolution was passed by 31 
votes in favour, none opposed, 2 abstentions, and 
4 absent, of the Committe_e's 37 members. 
We have mentioned this broad participation in the 
drafting and passage of the resolution because it 
is the first sign, highly eloquent if still provisional, 
of how much the «innovators» (1) count in Parlia-
ment, showing their presence in all the political 
groups and their ability to carry very large majori-
ties with them. 
these worthy diplomats are concocting. For us, it 
is enough to note that the Council seems convin-
ced that the citizenry, their political parties, public 
opinion, and the European Parliament itself have 
no role whatsoever in the preparation of these re-
forms. They are being drawn up in secret by the 
diplomats, to be bestowed one fine day upon our 
peoples. 
Nobody knows anything about what the de 
Schouteete Committee is preparing. The commit-
tee has consulted no one, neither experts nor 
representatives of public opinion. Consequently, 
this body is quite ignorant of the degree to which 
our respective countries support or oppose the 
Genscher-Colombo Plan, where and how they 
want to amplify or narrow it. On the other hand, 
each nation's committeeman knows perfectly well 
the degree of acceptance or rejection enjoyed by 
the Plan's various propositions inside the 
establishment of his own Foreign Ministry, whose 
natural calling and inclination is to defend and 
protect its nation's sovereignty, even when such 
sovereignty is outdated or is harmful to the na-
tional interest. Finally, they know very well that 
each of these establishments with wonderful 
assurance asserts that its own v1s1on of what 
European Union can and cannot be is 
automatically the view endorsed by the country as 
a whole. 
Since this whole arrogantly myopic travail is 
shrouded in secrecy, the outcome can only by 
that the «Act» which the de Schouteete Commit-
tee is drafting will be nothing more than a solemn 
ratification of what already exists. Much ado 
about nothing. 
What can one say, next, of the way the Commis-
sion is treating this issue? It, too, feels it has no-
thing to learn from and nothing to say to public 
opinion and to political parties, the only valid in-
terlocutor for it being the Council, to which it mu-
st present its proposals. But it has long since -
sine~ its 1975 report on European Union, to be 
precise - abandoned all claim to ideas of its own 
on the subject. So the Commission has formed a 
task force, its task being to do the Commission's 
thinking for it. But the worthy functionaries of this 
task force lack even the resource available to the· 
Council's diplomats of relying on the traditional 
doctrines of their respective nations' Foreign Mi-
nistries. So they just put their noses to the wind 
- the wind from the Council, of course, the only 
one the Commission notices - to find out what's 
up and then inform their commissioners, deciding 
on their own what is and what is not possible in 
the istitutional sphere. 
We symphatize indeed with President Thorn, who 
came to tell the Institutional Committee that Par-
liament alone is capable of devoting itself to the 
substantial reform the Community so sorely 
needs and to urge it not to err on the side of intel-
lectual and political timidity. 
However, if the commitment undertaken by Parlia-
ment on 9 July 1981 is to have some chance of 
success, the Assembly must not imitate the Coun-
cil and the Commission; it has to do more than ju-
st naming a committee to work on institutional re-
form amidst general igr,orance and indifference. 
cioSi,.LE 
The Assembly. must not passively await the re-
commendations which its Institutional Committee 
will bring in at the end of its tabors. It must not ne-
glect the issue in the interim. 
Parliament must participate as such, with debates 
and subsequent open votes, in the formulation of 
the reform plan while the project is taking shape. 
Only on this condition can Parliament feel that 
the reform is truly its own; only thus will the As-
sembly as such, as well as all the members who 
will have taken part in the formulation and appro-
ved the final text, feel themselves really commit-
ted to defend the reform in every Community 
country against the immobilists who are sure to 
raise their voices. 
Of course, participation by Parliament alone will 
not be enough. We shall have to get the attention 
of public opinion, win the interest of the pro-
European parties, make our views and our influen-
ce felt inside the national Parliaments that will ha-
ve to ratify the project, alert the governments that 
they will be asked to present the plan to their Par-
liaments. 
If the European Parliament and its Institutional 
Committee abide by the timetable laid out in the 
last article of the Guidelines (see the last § of pa-
ge 8 of this letter), the governments and legislatu-
res of our Member States will have been presen-
ted with the reform treaty by the time of the 1984 
European elections. But they will certainly not ha-
ve ratified it by that time, and the hostile voices of 
the immobilists will have begun to make themsel-
ves heard everywhere. 
In this situation, the main issue for Europe-
oriented parties in the-1984 election campaign will 
be an appeal to the voters to endorse, in the ballo-
ting, !he pro-reform parties and individual MEPs. 
Such an electoral outcome is indispensable if the 
re-elected European Parliament is to have the poli-
tical authority needed to oversee and encourage 
the ratification process. 
3 
4 The battle will be highly complex, and victory will require considerable political tenacity. But its pre-
mise - both logical and political - will have to 
be a wholehearted endorsement by Parliament of 
its reform project. 
This is why the Institutional Committee has adop-
ted the procedure outlined above. After drafting 
guidelines for further elaboration, and before em-
barking upon this second stage in its labors, the 
Committee asks Parliament as a whole to endorse 
its Guidelines. The Assembly would thus at one 
and the same time give the Institutional Commit-
tee its political support and offer European public 
opinion a harbinger of things to come. 
Designation of Rapporteurs for the Second Stage 
As proposed by Mr Ferri, the chairman, the Institu-
tional Committee has named six rapporteurs, who 
in conformity with the Guidelines shall draft 
detailed reports over the second half of this year. 
They are: 
1. Jacques Moreau, for economic policy 
2. Gero Pfennig, for social policy 
3. Derek Prag, for foreign policy 
Crocodile Club Activities 
Since the Institutional Committee has begun its 
wock, the Crocodile Club has been concerned not 
to intrude, but at the same time it has sought to 
keep on with its own work of in-depth study of the 
great issues of Community life. Thus the Club has 
decided upon a modification of its forms of activi-
ty. 
Starting in April, the Crocodile Club has been 
holding a regular working lunch, on Wednesdays 
of each plenary session, from 1 :00 to 3:00 o'clock. 
The aim is to allow regular encounters and ex-
change of views among the European Parlia-
ment's «innovators». 
Three of these working lunches have already been 
4. Michel Junot, for finances 
5. Karel De Gucht, for Union law 
6. Ortensio Zecchino, for institutions. 
The rapporteur-coordinateur, Mr Altiero Spinelli 
will ensure the coordination and consistency 
among the six reports. 
We wish the six rapporteurs all the best in their 
work. 
held, dedicated to the following topics: 
a) 21 April - Can the Community survive despite 
the ineffectiveness of its decision making 
body? What kind of reform does the Council 
need? 
b) 12 May - The 1984 European electoral cam-
paign: an opportunity and a means to mobilize 
public opinion in all Member countries at once 
around the topics of the ratification of the new 
Constitution-Treaty of the Union. 
c) 16 June - Variable-geometry Europe, multi-
speed Europe, Europe a la carte: is it a step for-




The Motion for Resolution of the Institutional Committee 5 
The European Parliament, 
- whereas membership of the European Com-
munities and the forms of cooperation based on 
them has brought the Member States and the In-
ternational Community benefits, but whereas 
time, experience and the appearance of new 
political and economic challenges make reforms 
necessary; 
- aware that the political, social and institu-
tional development of the European Community is 
far from fulfilling the needs and aspirations of the 
citizens of Europe to live together in peace, liberty 
and justice; 
- convinced of the need for the European Com-
munity, in the face of increased international con-
flicts, finally to play its full role in the world, i.e. as 
a catalyst for peace and development; 
- convinced that a reform of the institutions is 
indispensable for the improved operation of the 
Community, in order to enable joint action to 
tackle the political, social and economic 
challenges of the future; 
- wh~reas the efforts being made to achieve a 
better functioning of the institutions within the 
ambit of the existing Treaties should be 
tenaciously pursued pending the necessary 
reforms which Parliamen has undertaken to 
prepare; 
- having regard to its resolution of 9 July 1981, 
in which it decided to take the initiative in a new 
political and legal process to establish European 
Union; 
- more than ever convinced that texts introdu-
cing institutional changes must be drawn up by 
Parliament itself, if necessary in successice 
stages; 
- convinced that public opinion, if properly in-
formed, will strongly support moves towards Euro-
pean Union; 
- having regard to the first report of the Commit-
tee on Institutional Affairs. 
The objective of European Union 
and the initiative of European Parliament 
1. Recalls that: 
- the objective of achieving European Union was 
fixed as early as 1952 by the Treaties establi-
shing the first Community and has been reaffir-
med since then on numerous occasions in trea-
ties, various agreements, declarations and ini-
tiatives, as can be seen from the Collection of 
Texts assembled by the-Committee on lstitutio-
nal Affairs; 
- progress towards the objective of Unione, 
though important, has been spasmodic, inade-
quate to meet the economic and political chal-
lenges faced by the Community, and increasin-
gly threatened by nationalistic practices and 
the re-establishment of traditional diplomatic 
procedures; 
and declares that: 
- the achievement of the Union remains essential 
in order to develop common actions which are 
stronger, bolder and more deeply rooted in po-
pular consent than those pursued hitherto, in 
view of the increasing dependance and vulnera-
bility of the Community; 
- the forthcoming enlargement of the Community 
to include other Member States makes these 
reforms all the more urgent. 
The need to draw a new draft treaty 
2. Considers therefore that, on the basis of the 
Treaties and Community agreements, declara-
tions and Acts currently in force, a draft set of mo-
difications to the Treaties should be prepared de-
6 fining clearly the tasks, powers and institutions of the Union, based on the fundamental values of the Community. 
The main guidelines proposed 
3. Proposed as the basis for such a draft the follo-
wing broad guidelines: 
The Tasks of the Union 
4. The tasks of the Union - as notably proposed 
by the Paris summit of 1972 and by the 1975 
reports of the Parliament, the Commission, the 
Court and Mr Tindemans - will be formulated in 
a perspective of: 
a) the growing political, economic and social 
solidarity of its peoples, based on respect for 
human rights (individual and collective), and 
democratic freedom, as well as cultural and 
ethnic diversities, progress in social justice, 
stable economic growth, the search for full 
employment and an improving quality of life and 
the elimination of regional imbalances; 
b) genuine efforts to achieve balances and just 
economic and social development for all the 
countries of the world and a stable and open 
economy; 
c) a strong and responsible contribution to peace 
and security encompassing respect for the rights 
of all peoples; 
d) of the responsibility for conserving and restor-
ing nature and natural resources as a basis for 
continued sustainable development. 
5. The principle to subsidiarity, which is one of 
the essential principles of the Union, means that 
the Union will undertake only those tasks which 
can be carried out jointly more effectively than by 
the Members States individually or in which the 
involvement of the Union is indispensable, implies 
that: 
a) the Union will act only in clearly defined areas; 
b) the Union's powers will take strict account of 
the division of tasks and of areas of activity bet-
ween the Union and the Memeber States; 
c) the division of tasks, of areas of activity and of 
powers will take account of the present stage, but 
also the outlook and inevitable evolution of the 
Union. 
The Powers of the Union 
6. lri order to carry out these tasks, the content 
and scope of which may vary according to the 
Union's rate of development, the latter must 
possess appropriate powers: (i) to ensure com-
patibility and convergence between the policies of 
the Member States, (ii) to permit the formulation 
and application of common policies, and (iii) to 
propose new initiatives, whenever the principle of 
subsidiarity so requires, in the following areas: 
a) those objectives laid down in the Treaties of 
Paris and Rome; 
b) general economic policy (including credit, in-
vestment, taxes, research) and policy in specific 
sectors of the economy (industry, agriculture, ter-
tiary sector), energy and commerce, notably in 
raw materials. 
c) monetary policy, and the parallel development 
of the economic and monetary aspects of 
economic and monetary union, in particular the 
development of common instruments; 
d) the implementation of a policy for society, 
notably in the fields of social policy, regional 
policy and environment policy, culture, and infor-
mation policy; 
e) the gradual transition from national measures 
of cooperation with the countries of the Third 
World to a vigorous common policy of develop-
ment aid aimed at promoting a more just world 
economic order; 
f) the gradual framing of a common European 
policy in the field of international relations and 
security. 
The Institutions of the Union 
7. The European Union shall be endowed with in-
stitutions according to the principle of separation 
of powers, which will provide democratic 
legitimacy and scrutiny of Community decisions, 
ensure the involvement of the Member States and 
improve the operational capability of the Com-
munity and its willingness to take decisions. 
The Institutions of the Community prefigure those 
of the Union, but in particular the distribution of 
powers between them will have to be altered to 
strengthen the role of the Commission, to em-
phasise the political control exercised by Parlia-
ment and to redefine the role of the Council in 
order to strengthen their ability to act and make 
them more responsibe to the needs of an 
organisation which unites not only states, but 
also peoples and citizens. 
8. Taking as a starting point the Community's ex-
isting institutions - which must be adjusted in 
such a way as to remedy existing deficiencies and 
allow the Union to assume new tasks and extend 
its responsibilities - the Institutional Committee 
shall define the structure and powers of the in-
stitutions of the Union according to the following 
criteria: 
a) a new balance must be struck between the in-
stitutions in which each one, within the limits of 
the competence of the Union, will be a vital ele-
ment in the European edifice and will play an 
essential role within the limits of the Union's 
powers, 
b) the Commission will play its full role as exe-
cutive and initiator as the pivotal institution of the 
Union. To this end, its statute will be revised with 
regard to its appointment, its internal structure 
and its responsabilities, 
c) the Council and the Parliamen, whose man-
dates derive from the Member States and the 
citizens of the Union respectively, will exercise 
legislative·power jointly, on the basis of proposals 
from the Commission or on their own initiative. 
Similarly, they will ratify jointly any treaties con-
ciio!ri,ILE 
eluded by the Union and jointly constitute the 
budgetary authority of the Union. 
d) the Parliament will exercise political supervi-
sion of the executive and participate in an ap-
propriate way in its appointment, as well as in the 
nomination of members of the Court, 
e) the Council must be able, through appropriate 
procedures, to take decisions promptly in areas of 
its competence, 
f) the role and competences of the European 
Council shall be defined, 
g) the institutional ties between European 
Political Cooperation and the Community Treaties 
shall be strengthened, 
h) the Court of Justice will retain its central posi-
tion in a system based on the law and the separa-
tion of powers, 
i) the nature and the role of the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Court of Auditors will 
be adapted to the needs of the Union. 
The Union's Finances 
9. From time to time, and in any case at intervals 
that will be defined, in accordance with ap-
propriate procedures involving the Union and the 
Member States, tax resources shall be apportion-
ed between the Union and the States according to 
criteria based on the tasks and obligations of the 
Union. Within the limits of this apportionment, the 
Union and the States shall autonomously assess 
their resources and draw up their budgets. 
Transitional Measures 
10. The Community patrimony, embracing the ex-
isting laws and policies of the Communities, 
political cooperation, and the European Monetary 
System and all the other organs or institutions 
created within the Community context, shall re-
main in force within the Union unless and until 
any of these are altered by new laws or policies of 
the Union. 
7 
8 Constitutional Revision 11. The rules for the revision of the Treaty of the 
Union shall be differentiated according to the ex-
tent of the revision proposed and to the stage 
reached in the achievement of the Union at which 
they are to be applied. 
Further work of the Committee 
12. Instructs its Committee on Institutional Af-
fairs to undertake the necessary consultations 
with national and Community authorities when de-
veloping these guidelines, to draw up on their ba-
sis a series of proposals which the Parliament will 
consider early in 1983; and, in the light of these 
deliberations, to draw up a preliminary draft of the 
Treaty which shall be submitted to Parliament in 
the autumn of 1983. 
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Dear colleagues, 
In this issue we print two of Spinelli' s speeches to the 
European Parliament, as we feel that the ideas he set 
forth on these two occasions deserve the attention of 
those MEPs who were not present when they were 
delivered as well as of this letter's many readers 
outside the Parliament. 
On 19 November 1981, when Mr. Genscher and Mr. 
Colombo presented their draft of a European Act to 
Parliament, Spinelli had just five minutes available, 
which explains the extreme brevity of his reply. On 
November 3rd, with a full hour allowed to him as 
rapporteur on the '82 budget, he had an opportunity 
to develop his thinking more fully. We have excerpted 
the politically most significant portions of this report. 
Altiero Spinelli 
Felice Ippolito 
Reply to Mr Genscher and Mr Colombo 
I shall attempt to persuade you, Mr. Genscher and Mr. 
Colombo, to try to place yourselves, as it were, above 
yourselves, at the lofty height of the task you have 
yourselves assumed. 
We are grateful to you for your initiative, because by 
proposing this European Act you have shattered a 
taboo that has too long weighed down the construe-
tion of Europe, the taboo that forbade lookin~ beyond 
the Community's specifically economic business. You 
deserve our praise for having said that time has come 
to begin acting in favour of the progressive creation of 
a political Union pledged, certainly, to further develop-
ment of common economic policies, but also to carry 
on a common foreign policy and a common security 
SUMMARY 
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2 policy, hence to undertake joint initiatives of a diplomatic and strategic nature that can make an 
active contribution to the building of peace. Thank 
you, then, for forcing our governments, our Commu-
nity, our peoples, to grasp clearly the notion that these 
new common policies require common means of 
decision and of action. 
And yet you have also been, in this initiative, men of 
little faith and of little imagination ! 
I have not forgotten, Mr. Genscher, that six or seven 
years ago you persuaded your party to commit itself in 
favour of a European Constituent Assembly. But you 
have forgotten. 
More recently, on November 26th, 1980, in the 
Bundestag, you sproke the following words : « It is not 
my impression that the impulse (to draw up a 
Constitution for Europe) can come from the national 
governments. It can only come from the directly 
elected European Parliament.» At the time you spoke· 
these words, you were aware of the Crocodile Club's 
initiative. I am the first to admit that Parliament has 
been guilty of excessive slowness in taking on this 
task. At last, however, it has taken it on, and shortly it 
will set to work. 
But you have not been patient, you have too soon lost 
your faith in the Parliament, you were quick to turn the 
task of drafting this Act over to your diplomats. And , 
what you got from them was precisely what you 
yourself had foreseen. In effect, they proposed and 
got accepted an umpteenth version of intergovern-
mental cooperation. 
I do recognise, however, that for the time being such 
intergovernmental cooperation is all you have available 
and that it is with that implement that you must move 
to confront the most burning international problems. 
But we ask you to be fully aware of the provisionality, 
unpredictability, and fragility inherent in this method. 
Please don't come to tell us that in five years the 
Council will evaluate this experiment and, if necessary, 
propose a treaty to consolidate the Union. Say rather 
that there is no experiment to be done, because ' 
everything is already known in this matter, but that 
you will do your best to keep this uncertain and fragile 
cooperation alive in order to give Parliament the two or 
two-and-a-half years needed to prepare its draft of a 
Fundamental Law for the European Union and submit 
it to the Member States for ratification. 
In that case, we should applaud your initiative 
wholeheartedly, and we should feel encouraged to 
accelerate our constitutional work so as to come as 
soon as possible to your aid, in that trench of yours 
which in the long run is untenable. And you will have 
served Europe well. 
In a word, gentlemen, have faith in this Parliament, 
which is the only institution with the right to speak and 
to make proposals in the name of the emerging 
Eropean people that elected it. 
You have also shown a lack of imagination. You have 
well understood, that in order to have at least a 
minimum of common policy, especially in security 
matters, our governments - provisionally but urgen-
tly - cannot but cooperate. And you saw that you 
could not limit yourselves to proclaiming its necessity 
but had to ensure that it have a certain efficiency. 
Yet with your Act however, you seek efficiency in a 
proliferation of Councils, Committees and Subcom-
mittees, in a bizarre itinerant secretariat of variable 
structure - in short, in a proliferation of structures 
and mini-structures, all of the same intergovernmental 
character. And then, once everything has been ground 
up and digested by these committees and councils, 
the policy thus agreed upon is to be carried out, in 
your view, by each individual State acting on its own 
account. 
Haven't you heard that during the F(rst and Second 
World War the Allies found themselves is an 
emergency situation that forced them to institute a 
common military policy on the battle fronts, a 
common supply policy, and so on? And that to meet 
such emergencies they decided, through Acts similar 
to your own, with no juridical formalities, with no 
institutional commitments, with nothing binding for 
the future, to appoint Foch or Eisenhower as 
Commander-in-Chief of their armies, Monnet as 
administrator of their supply agencies ? Have you 
never heard of those Acts ? 
Your own Act, highly provisional though it is, would 
carry immense political significance if it were to 
suggest that the main guidelines of European security 
policy shall be determined, certainly, by the Member 
States meeting in the European Council - but that to 
negotiate and reach accords with Washington, with 
Moscow, in Madrid they shall name a plenipotentiary 
minister bound to act under their control and on their 
mandate, until such time as the European Parliament 
Reflections on the 1982 budget 
Parliament Asks ... 
This is the third time the elected Parliament will 
deliberate and vote on a Community budget. 
In 1979 Parliament rejected the proposed budget 
because it could « not permit the adoption of this 
budget unless and until the unjustified reductions the 
Council has made in non-compulsory expenditures are 
withdrawn and unless and until the initial measures to 
bring agricultural spending under control have been 
effectively implemented.» 
In 1980, in the course of the budget debate, 
Parliament delivered to the new Commission and to 
the Council « a solemn injunction that there be 
presented in 1981 a preliminary draft and a draft 
budget which presume the adoption in the course of 
the fiscal year of the necessary agricultural and fiscal 
reforms and which translate into financial terms an 
overall policy that provides for a proper balance 
amoung the various parts and which is worthy of a 
vigorous and growing Community ». 
In March 1981, prior to the presentation of the 
Commission's preliminary budget draft and the initia-
tion of the budget procedure, Parliament requested 
that the Commission « move up to mid-April the date 
cio18'D1LE 
has laid a more solid groundwork for our security 
policy. 
Cannot you find among your peers statesman whose 
bright mind, large experience and proved ability to act 
on behalf of the Community as a whole, would fit him 
to act as minister plenipotentiary for security affairs on 
behalf of the budding European Union ? 
I say to you, Foreign Ministers of West Germany and 
Italy, that in your Act and in your words we sense with 
dread such a lack of faith in the European Parliament 
and of imagination in present action.« With dread », I 
say, because our countries are slipping back toward 
the abyss and presently you, gentlemen, bear the 
greatest responsibility for this danger. 
for presentation of proposals of decisions modifying 
the agricultural regulations and establishing own 
resources, in order that the Commission take them 
into account in the preliminary draft which it will adopt 
in mid-May.» 
A few months later, in September, after hearing the 
Council's presentation of the draft budget, Parliament 
observes that this is a stagnation budget at a time 
when further development of the Community is more 
necessary than ever and calls upon the Commission to 
« present, in the course of the month of October, a 
schedule containing a global and properly motivated 
list of proposal of decisons and regulations, in order to 
enable Parliament to take account of the financial 
consequences they entail for the 1982 fiscal year» 
during the first reading of the draft budget. 
Let it not be thought that Parliament has been so 
exigent on budgetary affairs while lacking ideas of its 
own as to the policies the Community should adopt. 
Quite the contrary. Confronted with the inertia, or at 
best the sluggishness, of the Commission, Parliament 
has established, on its own initiative, a series of quite 
specific guidelines concerning Community policies in 
such areas as economic and monetary, structural. 
agricultural, and cooperation policies. 
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4 As it is utterly impossible to continue and develop these policies within the limits imposed by present 
fiscal means, Parliament spent a full year working on a 
resolution on own resources. In this resolution, the 
Assembly did not limit itself to merely sketching out a 
medium-term prospects for the achievement of a 
Community fiscal system that is more equitable than 
the present one; it also proposed three objectives to 
be implemented in the short-term: 
1) abolition of the 1 % ceiling on VAT, in concomi-
tance with the harmonious development of all 
those programmes the Community needs; 
2) introduction of a system for bringing about a more 
equitable distribution of the fiscal burden between 
Member States with low and high per capita 
income; 
3) establishment of a system of five-year agreements 
between the Community and the Member States 
with a view to instituting long-term programmes 
for the development of the Community and for a 
consequent distribution of fiscal resources bet-
ween the Community and the Member States. 
Certainly, our resolutions are not without their 
occasional omissions and contradictions. But the task 
of drawing up a consistent governmental programme 
tor the legislature is properly one for the Commission. 
Parliament has taken this task upon itself only by 
default, through the Commission's failure to perform 
it. Quite evidently, all Parliament could do was draw up 
veritable « cahiers de doleances », which nevertheless 
do indicate sufficiently clearly the general outlines of 
the political direction desired by this Assembly. 
Parliament has continually appealed to the Commis-
sion to translate these « cahiers » into operative 
proposals. 
The Commission responds ... 
The answers we have received from the Council and 
the Commission have always been enveloped in an 
almost excessive effusion of compliments and praise 
for what Parliament has done, of respectful apprecia-
tion of Parliament's role, of unctuous pledges to 
cooperate with it. 
Behind this luxuriant verbal vegetation, however, one 
can easily discern a cool and hard resolve to pay very 
little heed to what Parliament wants, a cool and hard 
resolve to tame and domesticate this Assembly, 
which has God-knows-what exalted notions of itself 
merely because it has been elected - and must be 
trained to limit itself to the emission of sentiments, 
wishes, protests, applause; it must learn that it is not 
and will never be that real democratic power which it 
claims to be, namely a power which takes part in the 
determination of policy and intends to play an ever-
greater role therein. 
The Commission, whose domestication, alas, is by 
now almost fully accomplished, has ignored the 
requests we addressed to it in the March guidelines, in 
the Pfennig Resolution and in the September resolu-
tion. 
We were demanding a political linkage between the 
· 82 budget and the proposals for decisions which the 
May 30 mandate requested of the Commission. This 
would have enabled us to include the initial effects of 
the new policies in the budget. 
The Commission answered coolly that the preliminary 
draft would have ignored the mandate. As to all our 
resolutions, the Commission quite simply proclaimed 
itself unaware of their existence. 
Subsequently, the Commission said that its refusal to 
institute the demanded linkage was only for « techni-
cal reasons » - and these two words, have to be 
added to the word « pragmatic », to mean the simple 
refusal to adopt any policy, to defend it, to translate it 
into detailed and specific proposals. The « technical 
reasons » are now quite plain to see : they amount to 
the fact that in the execution of the mandate, far from 
complying with Parliament's request, the Commission 
neither has presented any proposals for decisions, nor 
has any intention of doing so in the near future. All the 
Commission is ready to give a programme of 
memoranda which, after making the round of the 
Council table and after debates timed down to the 
minute in this Assembly, will allow its bureaus to 
plunge into interminable talks with the bureaus of the 
COREPER. The Commission undoubtedly hopes that 
these mountains will ultimately give birth to some tiny 
mice at least. The newer members of the Commission 
aren't familiar with the game. But we - my dear 
friends Haferkamp· and Ortoli - we veterans know 
this sad game of memos only too well, don't we? 
It is this attitude on the part of the Commission that 
explains the fact that the budget has come into being 
with the major defect of not being based upon any 
political vision. 
Let no one come to tell us that this is a « transitional 
budget ». A transition is always a transition to 
something. But the text which the Commission 
submitted to the budgetary authorities is designed 
only to enable the Community to maintain its day-to-
day existence - nothing more. 
... and so does the Council 
The Council, our partner in the budget procedure, was 
even drier and more laconic. By the terms of the 
Treaty, the Council is required to set forth its reasons 
for any departure from the preliminary draft budget. 
Yet, though the Council has made extensive cuts in all 
structural and cooperation expenditures, anyone who 
has read its meagre so-called explanatory statement 
knows that this consists of a mere unexplained 
summary of the cuts effected, with not even the 
shadow of a justification. For it is not an explanation 
to say in a couple of lines that we're all going through 
a period of severe budgetary austerity. A serious 
justification would have meant on the one hand 
explaining why austerity strikes essentially credits for 
structural spending programmes, which are not 
inflationary since they help to raise productivity, yet 
leaves untouched the price-support spending, which 
by its nature is inflationary. And on the other hand, it 
should have to succeed in the impossible task of 
demonstratinq that at the present moment the 
ciicJSi,.11 
stagnation of the European Community is in the 
interest of Europe and of its States. 
The Dispute over« Compulsory 
Expenditures » 
An ongoing dispute recurs each year, and always in 
the same terms, among the Council, the Commission 
and Parliament over the list of expenditures which 
according to the revised Article 203 of the Treaty of 
Rome « necessarily result from the Treaty or from the 
acts adopted by virtue of the Treaty». These are 
commonly referred to as compulsory expenditures, 
and the special importance of this list flows from the 
fact that these expenditures are approved through a 
special procedure, different from that used for all the 
rest of the budget (I repeat : all the rest of the budget, 
that is, all non-compulsory expenditures and all 
revenues). Moreover, this list determines, by exclusion, 
the volume of non-compulsory spending which serves 
to set the maximum rate and determine the margin for 
manreuver within which Parliament exercises its 
absolute right to the final say. 
So each of the three institutions draws up its own list, 
but in full knowledge that it cannot impose that list on 
the other two, for this would amount to a unilateral 
infringement on their powers. All expenditures enume-
rated in Parliament's list are to be found in the other 
two lists; the Commission adds some items and the 
Council adds still others. 
As the Treaty does not specifically stipulate who has 
ultimate authority over the list, the three institutions 
must necessarily come to an agreement. If they fail to 
reach agreement on a particular item, that item cannot 
be considered compulsory, and its approval automati-
cally follows the ordinary budget procedure. 
After waiting in vain from one year to the next for 
some resolution of this dispute, the Budget Commit-
tee has asked Mme Veil to call upon the Council to 
institute a procedure of coordination with the Com-
mission and with Parliament aimed at drawing up a 
joint list aqreed to by all. 
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6 Parliament is resolved, both on first and on second reading, to consider as compulsory expenditures only those items accepted as such by all three institutions. 
If agreement has not been reached, Parliament will 
consider as compulsory for all purposes only the items 
of its own list, because these are the only items that 
have been accepted by all three institutions. 
We are still waiting for a reply from the Council to our 
request for urgent coordination prior to the second 
reading of the budget. 
On FEOGA Guarantee ... 
I shall ask you to approve all the changes recommen-
ded by the Budget Committee for farm price supports. 
However, there is no hiding the fact that these credit 
reductions and the transfers to Chapter 100 have 
minimal political significance. For while the figures set 
forth in the other titles represent an authorisation for 
the Commission to make specified outlays, these farm 
credits are nothing more than forecasts of dubious 
reliability, based as they are on the weather and world 
market prices. 
If, under these circumstances, the funds provided 
under Titles l and 2 should prove insufficient, it would 
be compulsory for the Community as a whole, hence 
for the European Parliament as well, to increase or re-
transfer the necessary sums. 
As long as the agricultural regulations remain unalte-
red, that is the way things will go in the implementa-
tion of these two titles. 
... on the Regional Fund ... 
As for the Regional Fund, it is my duty as rapporteur 
to support a transfer to Chapter 100 which binds the 
Commission for a total of 170 million ECUs in 
disbursements and 323 million ECUs in commitments, 
and I shall ask you to vote its approval. I must confess, 
however, that this decision is somewhat puzzling to 
me. The image I have of the Commission is of one that 
shakes off the Council's yoke it has borne for too 
many years, becomes stronger and assumes more 
fully its responsibility to govern and administer the 
Community. The image I have of our Parliament is of 
one possessing effective legislative, fiscal, and control 
powers, but not pretending to govern itself. I invite 
you to reflect carefuly on this matter. We insist 
tenaciously that the Commission must not have its 
hands tied in the implementation of the budget by so-
called « consultative » intergovernmental committees 
which in reality have the power to withdraw the 
implementation of a regulation from the Commission's 
competence and to send it back to the Council. But by 
this transfer to Chapter 100 what else are we 
ourselves doing but trying to take over the proper role 
of the Commission in the implementation of the 
budget ? This additional yoke which we would put on 
the Commission's neck alongside that of the Council 
would have an equally detrimental and paralysing 
effect on the Commission's capabilities for govern-
ment. 
... and Cooperation 
As concerns cooperation, one may well ask whether 
Parliament has responded satisfactorly, at least for 
what is under its own control, to the formal request 
made by this Chamber itself, with the virtually 
unanimous passage of the Ferrero resolution and, 
more recently, the approval of the Pannella resolution 
by the absolute majority of the Members. 
Basing themselves on Parliament's adoption of this 
position, Pannella and others have presented amend-
ments intended to answer to the will of Parliament. 
The Budget Committee calls upon you to vote against 
these amendments, and as rapporteur I communicate 
that recommendation to you. It is dictated by the 
concern for budget austerity, which has led the 
Commission to block appropriations in excess of the 
preliminary draft levels. 
Speaking for myself, however, I must say that never 
has austerity been more ill-directed or more ill-timed. I 
have reminded vou of the resolutions voted by this 
very Parliament, resolutions which are not ancient 
history but actions of yesterday and the day before. 
Must I remind you of the Cancun Conference, the cry 
of desperation to be heard from so many countries, 
the appeals of the Pope, the hunger strike being 
Parliament between resignation and action 
Parliament customarily concludes this first reading 
with the passage of a resolution which gives the 
Assembly an opportunity to deliver an overall political 
judgment. 
By voting the passage of the resolution as drafted, you 
will express a severely critical judgment on the draft 
budget. You will underscore the efforts Parliament has 
made to improve it but will also emphasize the narrow 
limits within which it was forced to operate, which 
means that all our efforts notwithstanding, the budget 
is and remains one of stagnation. The insurmountable 
obstacles for Parliament consisted effectively of the 
1 % ceiling on VAT on the one hand and, on the other, 
the lack of a programme of budget reform and reform 
of Community policies. 
You will underscore the predominant responsibility of 
the Council, which should express a much greater 
degree of joint political intent, so that Parliament could 
approve a budget containing the outlines of future 
· restructuring of the budget and of Community 
policies. 
You will not conceal the fact that however broad the 
responsibilities of the Council. it can not even begin to 
move if the Commission opts not to exercise its power 
of initiative, which consists in the presentation of 
proposals for decisions. 
You will remind the Executive Commission that up to 
now it has neglected to act on Parliament's express 
request to link the budget process together with that 
regarding implementation of the May 30 mandate. 
And finally, you will say to the Commission that 
Parliament expects it to make up for lost time and for 
the wasted oooortunities; and that upon conclusion of 
~ILE 
carried on by one of our own colleagues, which - let 
there be no illusions - the whole world will be · 
watching ? After asking, in the name of my commit-
tee, for a vote against the Pannella amendments, I 
myself will raise my hand in favour. 
the imminent debate on implementation of the 
mandate, the Commission is to present you with a 
calendar containing specific dates in the immediate 
future for presentation of proposals for decisions, 
which are essential if the budget is to be restructured 
in conformity with the indications of Parliament. 
In this draft resolution - whose adoption I ask, in the 
name of the Budget Committee - there is not a single 
word, not a single idea, with which I disagree. Yet I 
feel compelled to recognise the absence of any act of 
political will, the absence of any action by Parliament. 
And not only I myself but also, I am sure, many of my 
colleagues in this Assembly, are unhappy with it. 
This resolution is a grave act of political resignation on 
the part of Parliament, because all it contains is the 
expression of feelings, of wishes. « Parliament notes ... 
regrets ... expects ... » and that is all. 
Once you have voted this resolution, the Council, the 
Commission and the national governments will tell 
themselves, with a sigh of relief, that the taming of the 
European Parliament has made a long step forward. 
According to Sallust, Jugurtha exclaimed : « Senatores 
boni viri, senatus ma/a bestia », that is to say, that it 
was quite possible to suborn a good many Senators 
but that no one could shake the proud resolve of the 
Roman Senate to pursue its policy. 
I should not like it if some future Sallust. writing about 
this Assembly, were moved to say : « Senatores 
europaei malae bestiae, senatus bonus vir », that is, 
that taken individually you have the proud awareness 
of your responsibilities and a firm conviction of the 
need to enhance the role of Parliament in the interest 
of the Community, but that Parliament itself is a bonus 
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vir, a good fellow lacking self-confidence, quick to 
yield to external pressures. 
If this Parliament wants to become a point of 
reference and a pole of attraction for Europeans, it. 
must demonstrate that it intends to see to it that its 
will be respected. 
To do this, Parliament has only three tools. 
The first is rejection of the budget. The Assembly has 
used it and now knows its limitations. 
The second is Parliament's pledge to produce a new 
Constitution - Treaty of the European Union and to 
initiate a complex political campaign to go directly to 
the competent democratic authorities of the Member 
Nations with a request for ratification. This initiative 
will bear fruit only in the medium-term, however. 
Finally, there is the tool of the motion for censure, 
which can be wielded only if it is given full political 
significance. 
Censuring the Commission must not be done simply 
to punish the present Commission and get another, 
highly similar, body. 
Censure should constitute a solemn warning from a 
ma/a bestia to the governments whose task it is to 
renew the Commission : let them take notice of the 
fact that here sits an Assembly that represents the 
people of Europe, and that even within the structure of 
present Treaties, this Assembly will no longer permit 
the continuance of current institutional and inter-
institutional practice; that to start setting things right, 
it will no longer accept a Commission which, like the 
present one, conceives its role as that of a secretariat 
for the Council and anxiously awaits a nod of approval 
from the latter before getting to work. 
A motion for censure should signify that the new 
Commission must be aware that although it is 
appointed by national governments, it is controlled 
and may be obliged to resign by Parliament hence, 
that it must pay greater attention to what Parliament 
wishes. 
Meditating day after day for months on the deplorable 
course of this budget process and reflecting that this 
debate leads directly into the debate over implementa-
tion of the May 30 mandate, where we will be 
confronted anew with the same attitude on the part of 
the Council, which considers the Commission as its 
secretariat, and the Commission, which also considers 
itself as such, I had felt our resolution should inform 
the Commission and the governments in clear and 
unequivocal fashion that the sword of Damocles of a 
censure motion dangles over the head of the 
Commission unless it changes its method of work 
internally, with respect to us, and with respect to the 
Council. 
With a bonus vir reflex, the Budget Committee struck 
out that paragraph, which was the only one to go 
beyond the expression of feelings, and embody an 
action. 
As rapporteur, it is my duty to ask you to vote for the 
resolution as it is presented to you. But although I 
cannot vote against what the resolution says, I shall 
abstain, because I cannot forgive it for its failure to do 
what it should clo. 
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Dear Colleagues, 
We express our apologies for our lateness to those 
who have shown a certain interest in this letter of 
ours. Week by week we held off publication, hoping 
to bridle a possibly excessive critical spirit on our pa1t 
in the face of the desolate spectacle of the disarray that 
afflicted all the Community's activities in these first 
Twenty-five Years After 
The reasons behind the Community's present delin-
quescent state can be better understood with the aid of 
a serious - not hagiographic - historical meditation 
on the origins of the European Comunity. 
1 Twenty-five years after 
2 Our present Impasses 
3 What can we expect of the Council? 
3 The Issue of Political Will 
months of 1982. We had been hopefully awaiting some 
sign, any sign, that the Community was at least on the 
move. But we waited in vain. 
A.LTIERO SPINELLI 
FELICE IPPOLITO 
In the 1950s a good number of political, economic, 
diplomatic and military circumstances put unity among 
the democratic peoples of Europe on the political agen-
da. But those circumstances did not, however, indicate 
SUMMARY 
5 The Issue of Unanimity 
7 The Work of the Institutional Committee 
8 The Draft Guidelines of the Institutional Committee 
2 the path to be taken, which is only normal, as circum-stances can only pose problems, while the solutions remain in the hands of men - provided, that they ma-
nage to find them. 
Beneath the surface of day-to-day politics, that decade 
saw a lively battle of ideas launched by those who had 
given some thought to the possible ways and means of 
European unification, to win influence on the four or five 
statesmen in whose hands rested, at that moment, the 
possibility of moving the issue of unity from the realm 
of vision to that of action. These « inspirators » were 
divided into two groups - federalists and functionalists. 
The federalists felt the central question to be dealt with 
was the problem of organizing a new democratic poli-
tical power structure in Europe, alongside the nation-
states. This entity was to have certain limited but real 
authority and competence of its own, for its task of 
leading our peoples along the long and difficult road to 
unification of the economy, of international relations 
and of the armed forces. 
Those who were known at that time as functionalists, 
the most influential of whom was Jean Monnet, felt the 
central question to be dealt with was the creation of 
«concrete» common commitments in economic policy, 
whose implementation was to be delegated to a common 
authority, with its own administrative apparatus, while 
the power to decide not only on all further delegation of 
power should remain in the hands of the Member-State 
governments. In this view, the accumulation of « con-
crete » solidarities of this sort would almost automatically 
engender political union. 
The federalists had the force of logic on their side, while 
the functionalists had the strength of the experience of 
the « specialized agencies » invented by the Allies during 
the First World War and used again in the Second. 
Fear of the new things impelled the statesmen known as 
the «fathers of Europe» in the end to choose the method 
of « specialized authorities » preached by Monnet. The 
only exceptions were De Gasperi and Spaak, who c1t a 
certain moment understood the need for federalism. But 
they could overcome neither the fears of their colleagues 
nor the intellectual laziness of the parties. 
The federalists were the big losers of the 1950s, 
and from then on the European edifice has consisted of 
a « pragmatic » accumulation, rather chaotic and in-
consistent, of acts of economic unification decided on 
by a more and more pretentious but almost impotent 
Council and implemented by a European administration 
which felt itself to be ever more dependent on that 
Council. 
In the quarter-century since then, the functionalist option 
has given everything it was capable of - which has been 
considerable - but it has now reached the point where 
we have to return to the idea discarded at that time, 
of federal political union, because now even what has 
been achieved by the functionalist method risks being 
utterly undone. 
Our Present Impasses 
For years now everyone has recognized that agricultural 
policy has to be modified, because it is excessively pro-
tectionist. But year after year the Community's decision-
making body - the Agricultural Council - has failed to 
reach the necessary unanimity either to fix prices at 
levels closer to those of the world market, on the one 
hand, or, on the other, to introduce co-responsibility for 
the producers and income support for the poorest far-
mers. 
• 
Everyone has known for years that Britain suffers a 
considerable discrepancy between Community revenue 
and Community spending in that country. More to the 
point, it is known that this discrepancy can be corrected 
-. if the Community rectifies its agricultural policy, 
develops its structural policies and those of solidarity, 
institutes some progressive taxation, and eliminates the 
1 % ceiling on VAT receipts, which renders any broad 
or long-range policy impossible. But the Council is inca-
pable of reaching the unanimity required for undertaking 
any of these reforms. 
~ioS'DILE 
For years it has been clear that the countries of the 
Community need to move from the present institutional 
stage to the stage of a true Union which will assume re-
sponsibility for external and security affairs. But the 
only thing that the representatives of the Member-State 
governments manage to do or to propose consists of 
lengthening the list of topics to be debated in the Council 
and decided unanimously there. 
What Can We Expect of the Council ? 
Since the institutional system adopted so far in the con-
struction of Europe makes the Council the decision-
making body, and thus the central political body, the 
time has now come to ask whether its failings are acci-
dental or organic. 
To prevent any such analysis of the institutional reality 
of the Community from emerging, the indiscreet have 
hitherto been called upon not to raise so-called « theolo-
gical » questions and to be « pragmatic » which ultima-
tely means: resolved not to distinguish between appea-
rance and reality, between superficial and profound, bet-
ween improvised and well-founded, between casual coup-
ling of ideas that have nothing in common and the logical 
connection between ideas that follow one from another. 
But to see things as they actually are, we need to set 
this sort of pragmatism aside and begin thinking not only 
coherently but also with a modicum of courage. 
The first few stumbling-blocks met along the path of 
the Community could still be considered by the prag-
matic as mere accidents along the way, which could be 
overcome with no great difficulty. 
When the failing began to proliferate, two grand expla-
nations were pragmatically discovered, and these con-
tinue even today to be drummed into us: the lack of 
common political will and the requirement of unanimity 
for Council decisions. 
The Issue of Political Will 
The story of the lack of common political bring us 
to mind Moliere's Bachelierius, who explains that 
« opium f acit dormire, quia est in eo virtus dormitiva ». 
To say that there is no common political will is exactly 
the same thing as to say that the Council is a body with 
little capability for action, which does not actually ex-
plain much of anything. 
All the institutions of the Community - the Court, the 
Parliament, the Commission, and the Council - are 
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4 made up of members coming from different countries, with different political, juridical, cultural and linguistic 
experiences behind them. And none of these institutions 
can perform acts of will except by collective decision. 
Now, then, in three of these bodies, every time they 
confront an issue, a common European will is regularly, 
though laboriously, formed. And this will is generally 
oriented toward European construction. In the fourth 
body - the Council - this will is often lacking. And 
when it is achieved, it is always at a very low level of 
European solidarity. Often enough it tends to weaken 
and downgrade that solidarity. 
Tn the quarter-century of life of the Communities, we 
have many times seen men move from one institution to 
another, from the Commission to the Council and vice 
versa, from the Parliament to the Council and vice 
versa, from the European administrations to national ad-
ministrations. And quite regularly, their ability to achieve 
a common will together with their colleagues from other 
countries declined or improved depending on wether they 
were members of the Council or of the other Community 
institutions. This should make one think that the fault 
lies much more with the institution than with the men. 
It is not difficult to find the explanation for this diver-
gency in behavior between the Council and the other 
Community bodies. But the ruling « pragmatism » ob-
liges us not to reflect on it, to keep on wringing our 
hands over the Council's lack of good will, to keep on 
exhorting it to act like the other institutions. 
The members of the Commission, the Parliament, and 
the Court are bound, in the interest of the Community, 
to look at the issues they handle from a European point 
of view; and they are subject to no imperative mandate 
from anyone, and in particular not from their own 
country's governement. To be sure, it is in the nature of 
things that they are more sensitive to the needs of their 
own countries than to those of others. To be sure, if 
there were not, in our countries, some fairly widerspread 
feeling that our peoples have a common destiny, each 
would end up permanently and exclusively representing 
a national viewpoint. 
But that feeling does exist. It is thanks to it that the 
Communities were created, and by the very fact of 
existing the Communities have helped make that feel-
ing more widespread. Given this fact, the members of 
the Commission, the Parliament, or the Court gain the 
capacity to seek and to find actions of common will. 
Of course they do not forget the needs of their home-
lands, but they learn how to view those needs and res-
pond to them within the framework of encompaning 
European needs. That is the only meaning of being ca-
pable of common political will in a constructive sense. 
The Council is the only institution founded on a dif-
ferent principle. Its members act in their capacity as 
representatives of the Memberstates; they get their na-
tional administrations to prepare briefs on the issues 
they will have to deal with in the Council. They are 
responsible to their own governments and to their own 
national Parliaments, and they have no room for ma-
neuver beyond what their governments allow them. In 
other words, behind each member of the Council there 
is a weighty, complex, traditional policy and decision-
making proress, designed and installed for the purpose 
of expressing the national will. Of course, the prevading 
of European common destiny is in some way present in 
national decision-making processes as well, acting as a 
brake against the natural tendency to consider European 
problems only as a function of national problems. From 
time to time, the national policy making must confront 
crucial basic choices: to return (or remain) at the per-
ception of national interest pure and simple, or else to 
keep the Community alive and even, at times, move it a 
step fonvard. The fear of what intra-European relations 
would become if the European idea were to vanish, and 
the obvious superiority of the European perspective over 
the purely national stand-point, are such that the Coun-
cil (above all in the guise of the European Council) is 
capable in such crucial moments of taking - and nor-
mally does take - fundamental pro-European options. 
If endorsing an option were the same thing as realizing 
it, the unity of Europe would be accomplished by now. 
Just think of all the commitments jointly entered into 
by governments to create a common currency, common 
armed forces, a common presence on the international 
scene, or to endow the Community with adequate own 
resources, to strengthen Parliament's role in the legisla-
tive domain, to broaden the Commission's field of action 
- and the list is far from complete. 
Broad commitments, however, are generally only orien-
tations that reveal the perception of European problems; 
they are not yet the solution. In order for the commit-
ment to be followed by realization, it is necessary that 
the decision-making body be capable of undertaking a 
whole series deliberations, decisions, and actions, with 
continuity - because things can never be done at a 
stroke - and with consistency, so that the inevitable 
difficulties that arise do not cause people to lose sight 
of the commitment itself. 
Now by its very nature the Council is capable neither of 
such continuity nor of such consistency, because even 
though a European orientation has been adopted, in 
principle, at the highest levels, its implementation re-
mains always founded on the effort to reach agreement 
among ten independent national decision-making pro-
cesses. Designed to express national viewpoints, these 
processes have an inherent tendency to diminish, if not 
entirely eliminate, the scope of the European commit-
ment. The tendency is to give priority to the particular 
interests of each nation, to seek the lowest common 
denominator among them, if it exists, and, if it does not, 
to postpone any decision. 
It is not true, then, that a common will does not exist. 
The truth is that it cannot express itself with the requisite 
continuity within the Council. If a fish out of water 
dies, it's not because he lacks the will to live, it's because 
he needs water to live, and in the air there is not a 
sufficient quantity of water to enable him to live. 
The Issue of Unanimity 
A second pragmatic explanation of the Council's politic-
al ineffectiveness assigns responsibility to the fact that, 
in violation of the Treaties, it makes decisions only 
when internal unanimity is reached. 
If this practice were of but a few weeks' or months' 
date, we could still hope that it was no more than a 
slight infraction due to our governments' lack of fa-
miliarity with the rules of the Community. One could 
hope for a return to the Treaties. 
But in fact abandonment of the rule of majority vote 
dates back to 1966, the time of the Luxembourg « com-
promise » - that is, to the very moment when, with 
the end of the transitional period, the rule of the majority 
vote was to initiate. What this means is that that rule 
has not been abandoned, as we often hear it said - it 
has never been applied. The only exception is the Budget 
Council, and the reason for this will become clear fur-
ther on. 
Since the Luxembourg « compromise », the Commission 
and the Parliament have repeatedly urged respect for 
the Treaty, and the Council itself, particularly in its 
most prestigious manifestation, has recognized that ef-
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judge of whether this or that interest is «vital». But 
even under this formula, which would have reduced the 
commitment to vote by majority to virtually nothing, the 
Council has never abandoned the rule of unanimity. 
Such obstinacy forces us to conclude that there must be 
some profound cause at work here, and that if there has 
been a failure to apply the Treaty the fault lies not 
with the governments but with the Treaties themselves. 
In short, an absurdity remains an absurdity even if it is 
enshrined in a treaty. 
A group of States may decide that certain national po-
licies shall be put in common, thus becoming one com-
mon policy. In this case, these States must relinquish 
the power to make certain decisions, i.e. must renounce 
certain aspects of their individual sovereignty in favor 
of an appropriate group of common political bodies. H 
these bodies are democratic, the citizens regain as cit-
izens of the Community what they have lost as citizens 
of their nations, but the Member State's own sovereignty 
is reduced. As the individual State no longer decides 
certain matters, it cannot even happen that the state 
finds itself opposed to a decision but obliged to accept 
it because it is in the minority. 
A group of States may decide that certain policies, while 
remaining the province of the individual States, should 
cooperate in a certain manner. In this case, each of 
them reserves the power of decision on these policies, 
that is, it maintains sovereignty in those areas. All that 
these countries need is a more or less permanent con-
ference of representatives of the individual governments 
to try to a~ree on what each shall do to ensure coope-
ration. The decisions in this case can be taken only una-
nimously, for a sovereign State can accept only what it 
itself has decided to accept. In this case, acts of co-
operation are necessarily modest and precarious. But no 
one expects more from this method than what it can 
produce. 
The absurdity of the system enshrined in the Treaty 
is to have proposed the progressive building of common 
policies while entrusting decision-making power on them 
to a body capable of seeking only precarious cooperation 
between policies are and remain national. In this si-
tuation, is there anything strange about the fact that the 
Council maintains the rule of unanimity and does not 
succeed in performing the task assigned it by the treaties? 
If the Institutional Committee of the European Parlia-
ment wishes to open up the prospect of renewed pro-
gress of the Community toward true political Union, it 
must without doubt face the problem of broadening the 
duties and the jurisdiction of the Union, of transforming 
the Commission of the Communities into a true executive 
and the Parliament into a true legislative assembly. But 
above all it must be aware of the fact that no real pro-
gress is possible unless it proposes the demolition of that 
massive obstacle represented by the Council in its 
present form. 
For a long time to come there will be, in the building of 
Europe, a grey area between common policies and nat-
ional policies, the area of cooperation among national 
policies. In this domain the present Council still has its 
role, and for the reasons laid out above, it will continue 
to decide only unanimously. 
We call this area grey because it is characterized by the 
fact that agreement has been reached that certain matters 
can no longer be the exclusive preserve of the individual 
nation but there is as yet no general conviction that 
those matters must be the object of common policies. 
When the issues under discussion are the object of com-
mon policies that already exist or are in the process of 
formation, however, there is no place for the Council 
in its present form, with its national ministers, its de-
cision-making power, its procedural unanimity. 
To be sure, a Chamber of States must exist alongside 
the Parliament, and it must be endowed with special 
powers in order that the points of view of the Member 
States as such be perceived and taken into account. 
Thus there shall be national delegations to the Chamber 
of States, named by the various national governments. 
But they shall be named for fixed periods. The govern-
ments will trust their delegates to represent the national 
interest in what they say and do in the Chamber, but 
they will not be empowered to issue them with any 
imperative mandate, or to remove them from office be-
fore the end of their term. The Chamber will participate 
along with the Parliament in legislative activity and in 
monitoring the executive; but it will neither hold exclu-
sive responsibility for those functions nor be endowed 
with ultimate responsibility for them. Only under these 
conditions would it be reasonable to do away with the 
requirement of unanimity; for the delegates, while cer-
tainly pleading the case of their own States, would not 
be representatives of a national decision-making pro-
cess. That is, they would not represent their nations' 
sovereignty. 
It is no accident that the only case in which the Council 
votes on a majority basis, despite the Luxembourg «com-
promise», is in the Budget Council - namely, precisely 
where the Council holds neither exclusive nor ultimate 
power of decision, where in effect it acts only as a sort 
of Chamber of States in a bicameral system known as 
the « Budget Authority ». 
Here we can merely sketch out the main idea of how 
the present Council should be reformed. However, we 
are convinced that this reform will be the central point 
of institutional reform, and that everything else will 
depend on the fashion in which we manage to resolve 
this issue. 
The Work of the Institutional Committee 
The Institutional Committee held its first regular meet-
ing 27-28 January 1982. Since then it has: 
1) Named its Bureau made up of Mr. Ferri, Chairman, 
and Messrs Nord, Jonker and Pannella, Vice-Chair-
men; 
2) Named Mr Spinelli as rapporteur-coordinator; 
3) Established the political time-table for its work, on 
the basis of which: 
- Parliament will be asked to pronounce itself, in the 
course of the July session, as to the overall orientation 
of institutional reform. 
On the basis of the general guidelines: 
- The Committee will assign the following topics to 
six rapporteurs: 
a) jurisdiction of the Union in matters of internal and 
external economic policy; 
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c) jurisdiction of the Union in matters of political co-
operation, security, and development assistance; 
d) the finance of the Union; 
e) the law of the Union; 
f) the Institutions of the Union. 
-The reports, coordinated by the rapporteur coordi-
nator, will be submitted to the Parliament for approval 
in about January of 1983. 
- In the course of 1983, on the basis of these reports, 
the Institutional Committee will prepare, with the aid 
of jurists, a proposed draft treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Union. 
- At the end of 1983, the Parliament will be called 
upon to vote on this draft. 
- In early 1984, a Parliamentary delegation will visit 
the various capitals to deliver the draft treaty-consti-
tution to each government, requesting it to have it 
approved by the competent institutional bodies. 
Throughout all this work, the Institutional Committee 
will carry on broad consultations and will undertake an 
information campaign aimed at the national Parliaments 
and political parties. 
This timetable means that the European elections of 
June 1984 will be held with the draft treaty already sub-
mitted to the national Parliaments for consideration; 
consequently, the European election campaign will be 
dominated by this issue. 
The Draft Guidelines of the Institutional Committee 
After extensive debate lasting several sessions, Mr Spi-
nelli was asked by the Institutional Committee to pre-
pare the preliminary draft guidelines, which are to 
present under discussion in the Committee. The text is 
as follow: 
The European Parliament, 
- whereas the Communities and the forms of coope-
ration based on them have served our peoples well for 
30 years, but whereas time, experience gained and the 
appearance of new political and economic challenges 
make reforms necessary; 
- whereas the eff arts being made to achieve a better 
functioning of the institutions within the ambit of the 
existing Treaties should be tenaciously pursued pending 
the more fundamental reforms which Parliament has 
undertaken to prepare; 
- having regard to its resolution of 9 July 1981 in 
which it decided to set in motion itself a new ,political 
and legal process aimed at effectively establishing Eu-
ropean Union; 
- having regard to the first report of the Committee 
on Institutional A/faire. 
The Objective of European Union and the 
European Parliamenrs Initiative 
1. Recalls that: 
- the objective of European Union was fixed as early 
as 1952 by the Treaty establishing the first Community 
and has been reaffirmed since then on numerous occa-
sions in treaties, and in various agreements, declarations 
and initiatives, as described in the Committee on Insti-
tutions Affairs' White Paper, 
- for 30 years most of these initiatives have ultimately 
become caught up in the trammels of traditional diplo-
matic procedures, but declares that the achievement of 
the Union remains essential in order to develop com-
mon actions which are stronger, bolder and more deeply 
rooted in popular consent and those pursued hitherto, 
- the forthcoming enlargement of the Community to 
include other Member States makes this development 
all the more urgent. 
The Need to Draw a New Draft Treaty 
2. Considers therefore that, on the basis of the Treaties 
and Community agreements, declamtions and Acts cur-
rently in force, a draft of a new Treaty should be pre-
pared defining clearly the tasks, powers and institutions 
of the Union; 
3. Invites the Committee on Institutional Affairs to for-
mulate the elements of such a new draft, to engage in 
extensive consultations and to encourage a wide-ranging 
public debate on the issues of the Union. 
The Main Guidelines Proposed 
4. Proposes as the basis for such a draft of a Treaty 
the following broad guidelines). 
The Tasks of the Union 
5. The tasks of the Union shall be formulated in an 
historic perspective 
(a) of greater political, economic and social solidarity 
of its peoples in a context of respect for human rights 
and democratic freedoms, progress in social justice and 
efforts to achieve full employment and growth with sta-
bility, 
(b) of a strong and responsible contribution to the har-
monious and just economic and social development of 
the whole world and to keeping the world economy as 
open and as stable as possible; 
(c) of a strong and responsible contribution to the pre-
servation and restoration of peace, security and the right 
of all peoples to decide their own destiny; 
6. The principle of additionality, which is the essential 
principle of the Union, means that the Union will un~ 
dertake only those tasks which can be carried out jointly 
more effectively than by the Member States individually 
or which are essential to the existence of the Union. 
The Powers of the Union 
7. In order to carry out these tasks, the content and 
scope of which may vary according to the rate of evo-
lution of the Union, the latter must possess appropriate 
powers to ensure compatibilUy, convergence and co-
operation between the policies of the Members States, 
and to exercise its own initiatives (whenever the principle 
of additionality so requires) in the following areas: 
(a) the accomplishment of the objectives laid down in 
the Treaties of Paris and of Rome, 
(b) the various aspects of general economic policy 
(such as credit, investment, taxes, research) and policy 
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(c) the gradual transition from the phase of inter-go-
vernmental agreements to that of common instruments 
of monetary policy, and the maintenance of the neces-
sary parallel development of Monetary Union and Eco-
nomic Union, 
(d) the implementation of a policy, for society (such as 
social policy, regional policy, environment policy), 
(e) the gradual transition from national measures of 
cooperation with the countries of the Third World to a 
vigorous common policy of development aid aimed at 
promoting a more just world economic order, 
(f) the gradual framing of a genuinely common European 
policy in the field of internationale relations and security. 
8. These powers must be determined flexibly, according 
to the fields of action and possible stages of evolution, 
but they must in any event mee,t the following condi-
tions: 
(a) they must be sufficiently precise to enable the insti-
tutions of the Union to exercise them effectively, 
(b) they must take account of the outlook and inevitable 
evolution of the tasks of the Union, and may therefore 
have to be made subject to conditions of time or events 
which shall be carefully defined. 
The Institutions of the Union 
9. The Institution of the Community prefigure those of 
the Union but in particular the distribution of powers 
between them will have to be altered to strengthen the 
governmental role of the Commission, to emphasize the 
political control exercised by Parliament and to redefine 
the role of the Council; 
10. Taking as its starting point the Community's exist-
ing institutions, and drawing upon both the last 30 
years' experience and the new definitions of tasks and 
powers proposed above, the Committee on Institutional 
Affairs shall therefore define the structure and the po-
wers of the institutions of the Union according to the 
following cr#eria: 
(a) the Executive: the central institution with which the 
Union must be equipped is one which, within the limits 
of the powers of the Union, proposes policy guidelines, 
exercises legislative and financial initiative, adopts texts 
implementing the laws of the Union, administers the 
execution of the laws, financial measures and appropriate 
policies; the existing executive Commission will be able 
to assume these powers provided considerable modifi-
cations are made in the nature of its appointment, its 
internal organization, its powers and responsibilities, 
(b) the Parliament: the Union must have a directly and 
uniformly elected Parliament which, within the limits 
of the powers of the Union, can make laws, vote taxes, 
exercise political control over the executive and have 
an appropriate but determining say in the latter's ap-
pointment, 
(c) the Council: the Union must have a body in which 
the Member States as such can be represented by dele-
gations of their governments; the functions and mem-
bership of this body however, would differ according to 
the field of action; two separate, institutions should the-
refore be envisaged to replace the existing Council: 
- in those areas where executive power lies with the 
European Executive the latter should be the supreme 
political decision-making body, and the body represent-
ing the Member States would participate with Par-
liament (with appropriate but not - as at present -
exclusive or predominent powers) in the Union's legisla-
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tive and financial decisions and in the appointment of 
the Commission. The best name for this body would 
seem to be 'Chamber of States'; its members would be 
appointed by the governments but its membership should 
not vary as at present, 
- in those areas where the executive power still lies 
with the Member States, and where the oniy commit-
ment is the determination to reach joint conclusions, the 
intergovernmental body would remain the supreme po-
licy-making and decision-making body; the consultative 
role of the European Parliament and the role of the 
Commission should be strengthened however, to ensure 
that in the intergovernmental body, there are always 
voices to defend common view poin.ts and provide the 
stimulus for the transition from the intergovernmental 
level to the level of the Union;· the governments would 
remain responsible at all times for the membership of 
their delegations, from the level of Heads of Govern-
ment to that of ambassador; this body should keep the 
name ' Council' since it retains all the features of the 
existing Council, 
- the Court: the existing judicial power of the Com-
munity is susceptible of becoming - with slight altera-
tions - that of the Union;· the European Parliament, 
however, should have an appropriate say in the appoint-
ment of the judges of the Court; the Court should give 
final rulings on cases of violation of fundamental human 
rights, on the conformity of laws with the constitution 
of Union, and it should be empowered to impose 
santions; all the citizens of the Community should have 
direct access to the Court within the limit of its powers. 
The Union's Finances 
11. From time to time, in accordance with appropriate 
procedures involving the Union and the Member States, 
the tax resources shall be shared out between the Union 
-
and the States according to criteria based on the general 11 
outlook for the development of the Union; 
Within the limits of this apportionment, the Union and 
the States shall autonomously assess their resources and 
draw up their budgets; the resources and the budget 
of the Union shall be proposed by the Executive and 
voted, according to appropriate procedures, by Parlia-
ment and Council. 
Transitional Measures 
12. The Community patrimony, embracing the existing 
laws and policies of the Communities, political coope-
ration and the European Monetary System and all the 
other organs or institutions crated within the Community 
context, shall remain in force within the Union unless 
and until any of these are altered by new laws or polices 
of the Union. 
Constitutional Revision 
13. The roles for the revision of the Basic Law of the 
Union laid down in the Treaty shall be differentiated 
according to the extent of the1 revision proposed and to 
the stage reached in the achievement of the Union at 
which they are to be applied. 
Further Work of the Committee on Institutional 
Affairs 
14. Instructs its Committee on Institutional Affairs to 
undertake the necessary consultations with national and 
Community authorities when developing these guide-
lines; to draw up on their basis a series of proposals 
which the Assembly will consider early in 1983; and, 
in the light of these deUberations, to draw up a preli-
minary draft of the Treaty which shall be submitted to 
Parliament in the autumn of 1983. 
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